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I. INTRODUCTION
 Leading up to and during the financial crisis of 2007-08, inaccurate 
ratings from credit rating agencies contributed to systemic risk mis-
management by investors in asset-backed securities, which fueled 
an asset bubble and led to the collapse of asset prices and capital 
markets. These inaccurate ratings stemmed from a toxic mixture 
of factors—conflicts of interest, underresourcing, flawed models, 
information asymmetry, and a reduction in the need to maintain 
reputational capital. 
 Generally, credit rating agencies have been relied upon by both 
institutional and individual investors, as well as regulators, to play a 
gatekeeper role in financial markets, specifically in capital markets. 
Many credit rating thresholds are actually written into various state 
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and federal financial regulations and programs. Simply put, markets 
and governmental entities rely on the accuracy of ratings provided by 
the credit rating agencies. 
 On July 21, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) was signed into law.1 Dodd-Frank 
totals 849 pages, with nineteen pages devoted exclusively to the 
cause of “Improvements to the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies” 
in Title IX, Subtitle C.2 Of those nineteen pages, dealing with myriad 
regulations, duties, and mandated studies, one provision—containing 
a total of 185 words—stands out. 
 This 185-word provision, section 933(b) of Dodd-Frank, lowers the 
pleading requirement in class action lawsuits against credit rating 
agencies and is the focus of this Note.3 This Note argues that section 
933(b) of Dodd-Frank is indispensible to advancing the cause of credit 
rating agency reform due to its: (1) conduciveness to countercyclical 
implementation; and (2) empowerment of innovative private attorneys 
general, which are independent from the whims of federal budgetary 
constraints, agency capture, and political meddling. 
 However, section 933(b) is not perfect, and it must be supplement-
ed by excising National Statistical Ratings Organization references 
from various laws, thus restoring the incentive for rating agencies to 
gain and maintain reputational capital—a process thankfully set into 
motion by sections 939 and 939A of Dodd-Frank. 
II. GENERAL ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
 Since the turn of the nineteenth century, “credit rating agencies 
have acted as ‘gatekeepers’ to the financial markets by providing 
assessments of the creditworthiness [(that is, risk of default)] of fi-
nancial instruments.”4 The two largest credit rating agencies are 
Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s) and Standard & Poor’s (S&P), 
which each control approximately 40% of the $4 billion credit rating 
market.5 The remainder of the market is divided among Fitch Rat-
ings (Fitch) and other credit rating agencies.6 And the market is a 
 1.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 2.  Id. § 931–939H (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 3.  Id. § 933 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)). 
 4.  See Jonathan S. Sack & Kefira R. Wilderman, Civil Liability of Rating Agencies: 
Past Success, Future Danger?, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 15, 2010, http://www.maglaw.com/publications/ 
data/00228/_res/id=sa_File1/07009017Morvillo.pdf. 
 5.  Janet Morrissey, A Corporate Sleuth Tries the Credit Rating Field, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/business/27kroll.html. 
 6.  Id.
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highly lucrative one, with operating margins averaging 53% from 
2000 to 2007.7
 The general scales used by Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch are quite sim-
ilar,8 and the S&P scale will be used in this Note to discuss ratings. 
Ratings from AAA to BBB are referred to as investment grade, while 
ratings of BB and lower are referred to as noninvestment grade, 
speculative, high yield,9 or junk.10
 Market demand for credit ratings exists for a host of reasons. 
First, there is an information asymmetry between instrument issuers 
and investors.11 Issuers possess the information regarding the likeli-
hood of instrument default.12 Second, there is a high cost for individ-
ual investors of evaluating instrument creditworthiness.13 Third, 
there is an incentive for issuers to exaggerate the quality of their 
products.14 Therefore, credit rating agencies are relied upon as “gate-
keepers” by individual and institutional investors and “are central to 
capital formation, investor confidence, and the efficient performance 
of the United States economy.”15
 Credit rating agencies are also relied upon by financial regula-
tors16 due to the agencies’ roles as Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations (NRSROs).17 NRSROs came into existence in 
1975 when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted 
Rule 15c3-1 (pertaining to capital requirements for broker-dealers) 
and issued no-action letters to Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch, recognizing 
each as an NRSRO and thus allowing the broker-dealers who held 
 7.  STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET 
AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, MAJORITY AND MINORITY 
STAFF REPORT 257 (Comm. Print 2011) [hereinafter ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE]. 
 8.  The S&P scale for long-term instruments runs as AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, CCC, CC, 
and D. Understanding Standard and Poor’s Rating Definitions, STANDARD & POOR’S, at 10
(2009), http://media.umassp.edu/massedu/treasurer/Understanding_SP_Rating_Definitions.pdf. 
The Moody’s scale for long-term instruments runs as Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa, Ca, and 
C. MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, RATING SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS, at 9 (2011), 
http://moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_79004. The Fitch scale 
for long term instruments runs as AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, and C. FITCH
RATINGS: DEFINITIONS OF RATINGS AND OTHER FORMS OF OPINION, at 12 (2011), 
http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/ratings/fitch_ratings_definitions_and_scales.pdf. 
 9.  See HIGH YIELD BONDS, https://fidelity.com/bonds/high-yield-bonds (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2012). 
 10.  ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 7, at 27. 
 11.  See Caleb Deats, Note, Talk That Isn’t Cheap: Does the First Amendment Protect 
Credit Rating Agencies’ Faulty Methodologies from Regulation?, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1818, 
1824-25 (2010). 
 12.  See id. 
 13.  Id. at 1824. 
 14.  See id. at 1829. 
 15.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 931, 124 Stat. 1872 (2010). 
 16.  Id.
 17.  Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down 
for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 690 (1999). 
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paper that was rated investment-grade by two of the new NRSROs to 
deduct less when computing net capital.18
 There are now ten credit rating agencies designated by the SEC as 
NRSROs19 and “hundreds of rules, releases, and regulations” pertain-
ing to “securities, pension, banking, real estate, and insurance regu-
lation” incorporating the NRSRO designation.20 For example, state 
law permits Florida’s public pension fund to invest without limitation 
in “negotiable certificates of deposit . . . of prime quality of the highest 
letter and numerical ratings as provided for by at least one nationally 
recognized statistical rating organization.”21
III.   BACKGROUND: ROLE OF INACCURATE RATINGS IN THE                    
FINANCIAL CRISIS
“The three credit rating agencies were key enablers of the financial 
meltdown. The mortgage-related securities at the heart of the crisis 
could not have been marketed and sold without their seal of approval.”22
 Beginning in the late 1990s and continuing into 2006, home prices 
nationwide rose 67%; home prices in some markets such as Miami, 
Phoenix, and Los Angeles more than doubled.23 This rise was sharply 
at odds with historical trends24 and was fueled by increased specula-
tion in the housing market,25 as well as the proliferation of high-risk 
home loans,26 which were securitized (that is, bundled together into 
pools to which bonds were linked)27 by investment banks and sold to 
investors as residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs)28 and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).29
 18.  Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed. Reg. 
21306, 21307 (Apr. 25, 2005) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 19.  Morrissey, supra note 5. 
 20.  See Partnoy, supra note 17, at 690-91. 
 21.  FLA. STAT. § 215.47(1)(l) (2010). 
 22.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, at xxv (2011), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ 
fcic/fcic.pdf. 
 23.  Id. at 5. 
 24.  See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 7, at 26. 
 25.  See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 22, at 5. 
 26.  See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 7, at 17-24. 
 27.  See id. at 18. 
 28.  Id. at 28. 
 29.  Id. at 28-29. A CDO is a security linked to a pool of securities which has been 
purchased by a Special Purpose Entity. See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The 
Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1027 (2007). The 
securities in the Special Purpose Entity have been combined and then been split into 
tranches of varying credit risk, to which the CDO securities are linked. Id. CDOs can be 
linked to pools of different types of securities, including RMBS. See ANATOMY OF A 
FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 7, at 28. Additionally, synthetic CDOs exist, in which the 
long end of credit default swaps (CDS) make up the pool held by the Special Purpose 
Entity. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra, at 1028. A credit default swap is a two-sided contract 
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 From 2004 to 2007, Moody’s and S&P greased the gears of the 
RMBS and CDO market by issuing “investment grade credit ratings 
for the vast majority of RMBS and CDO securities issued in the 
United States.”30 During those years, roughly $2.5 trillion in RMBSs 
and $1.4 trillion in CDOs were issued by U.S. institutions.31 Without 
investment grade ratings, these products would have been much less 
marketable, as institutional investors would not have been allowed to 
purchase them.32
 By mid-2006, the U.S. housing market had peaked.33 “In late 2006, 
high risk mortgages began to go delinquent at an alarming rate.”34
In July of 2007, after RMBSs and CDOs began incurring losses, 
Moody’s and S&P began a series of downgrades for thousands of 
RMBSs and CDOs, triggering a collapse in the price of, and market 
for, these assets.35
 These July downgrades marked a turning point “and perhaps 
more than any other single event triggered the beginning of the fi-
nancial crisis.”36 A near-halt in many securitization markets began, 
leading to a crash in these markets, as investors lost confidence in 
underlying assets.37 By early 2008, losses in U.S. mortgage-backed 
securities reached an estimated $500 billion.38 By late 2008, the secu-
ritization of automobile loans, credit card receivables, and loans to 
small businesses had nearly ceased,39 the investment bank Lehman 
Brothers was bankrupt,40 and the U.S. economy had shed 3.6 million 
jobs.41 By 2010, over 90% of the subprime42 RMBSs issued in 2006 
and 2007 that were originally rated AAA had been downgraded to 
junk status by Moody’s and S&P.43
                                                                                                                  
in which the parties bet on the default of a debt issuer. Id. at 1021-22. The holder of the 
long end of the CDS is paid a premium by the holder of the short end; if the debt issuer to 
which the CDS is linked defaults, the holder of the long end pays the holder of the short 
end. Id.
 30.  See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 7, at 243. 
 31.  Id. at 8. 
 32.  See id. at 243. 
 33.  See Floyd Norris, In Construction, Home Building Alone Struggles to Its Feet, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 8, 2010, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/08/business/ 
economy/08charts.html. 
 34.  See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 7, at 243. 
 35.  See id.
 36.  Id.
 37.  See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 22, at 214. 
 38.  Frederic S. Mishkin, Over the Cliff: From the Subprime to the Global Financial 
Crisis 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16609, 2010). 
 39.  See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 22, at 214. 
 40.  ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 7, at 47. 
 41.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 22, at 390. 
 42.  Subprime is a term used to characterize higher-risk loans or borrowers. See 
ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 7, at 19. 
 43.  Id. at 31. 
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IV.   PRIMARY CAUSES OF INACCURATE RATINGS
A.   NRSRO Status Diminishes the Need for Reputational Capital 
 In theory, gatekeepers such as credit rating agencies depend on 
building up and maintaining their reputational capital, which is par-
amount to maintaining credibility and revenue.44 Reputational capital 
is essentially a reserve of good will which enables individuals and 
institutions to trust in a third-party gatekeeper for an assessment.45
“Absent other factors, the consumer of a product will purchase a rat-
ing if the expected benefit of the rating minus the actual cost of the 
rating is both positive and greater than the expected benefit of an 
independent investigation minus the actual cost of such an investiga-
tion.”46 According to the reputational capital theory, individual credit 
rating agencies will only survive and thrive if they are viewed as “ac-
curate and reliable in assessing the credit risks of borrowers.”47
 The credit rating industry is oligopolistic, as it is overwhelmingly 
dominated by Moody’s and S&P,48 and the barriers to entry are quite 
high (at least to gain the all-important NRSRO designation).49 Addi-
tionally, Moody’s and S&P rarely rate the same bond differently, 
which one would expect if the two were in real competition for repu-
tational capital.50
 Rather, Moody’s and S&P have obtained regulatory licenses, 
due to their status as NRSROs, and can engage in the business of 
selling these licenses to issuers51 in the form of ratings, with less re-
gard for gaining or maintaining reputational capital.52 Issuers have a 
great need for such NRSRO ratings, because their products are much 
less marketable without them. Many institutional purchasers are 
restricted, by various regulations and to varying degrees, in the 
amount of instruments not conferred top ratings by NRSROs that 
they can purchase or hold.53
B.   Conflicts of Interest 
 One glaring conflict of interest in the credit rating industry is the 
issuer-pays model, in which credit rating agencies are paid by the 
 44.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, 
Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1405 (2002).  
 45.  See Partnoy, supra note 17, at 628. 
 46.  Id. at 629. 
 47.  Id. at 631. 
 48.  See Morrissey, supra note 5. 
 49.  See Partnoy, supra note 17, at 710 (noting British credit rating agency IBCA, 
Ltd.’s eleven-year battle with the SEC to obtain full NRSRO recognition). 
 50.  See id. at 661. 
 51.  Credit rating agencies are paid by the issuers they rate. See Part IV(B), infra.
 52.  Partnoy, supra note 17, at 698. 
 53.  See id. at 691-92. 
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very issuers whose instruments they are rating.54 This would be akin 
to restaurants, hoping to gain the coveted three stars, paying Michel-
in to visit and supply a rating. Compounding this conflict of interest 
is the fact issuers unsatisfied with a proposed rating are free to take 
their business to a different agency, as agencies are only paid for rat-
ed deals accepted by the issuer.55 According to the testimony of one 
former Moody’s officer, “ ‘[t]he threat of losing business to a competitor 
. . . absolutely tilted the balance away from an independent arbiter of 
risk towards a captive facilitator of risk transfer.’ ”56
 The influence exerted by the issuer-pays model is more than sub-
liminal. Issuers have explicitly threatened credit rating agencies with 
a loss of business when desired analytical models were not applied.57
In turn, agency management threatened analysts with expulsion for 
being uncooperative with client-issuers, as well as for being too con-
servative in their assessments.58
 Moreover, a second type of conflict of interest exists when suppos-
edly neutral credit rating agencies offer, for an additional fee, “as-
sessment services” to issuers. Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch’s all maintain 
the ancillary business of providing such services, in which the agencies 
consult with and advise the issuers on how to structure instruments 
to achieve a desired credit rating for a particular instrument or class 
of instruments.59 “Having advised an issuer on debt structure, it is 
hardly likely that the rating arm of the [credit rating agency] would 
fail to grant the promised rating.”60
C.   Underresourcing 
 Leading up to the financial crisis, the rating agencies’ volume and 
complexity of work substantially increased, yet resources did not 
keep pace.61 Despite high margins and increasing revenue prior to 
the crisis, experienced talent was difficult to acquire due to manage-
ment’s reluctance to pay accordingly.62 “ ‘Guys who can’t get a job on 
 54.  See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 7, at 272-73. 
 55.  See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 22, at 210. 
 56.  Id.
 57.  See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 7, at 278-80. 
 58.  See id. at 274-75. 
 59.  See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT 
RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 42 (2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf. 
 60.  MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 54 (2009). 
 61.  Frank Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: An Institutional 
Investor Perspective 5 (Council of Institutional Investors, Research Paper No. 09-014, 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1430608. 
 62.  See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 22, at 149. 
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Wall Street get a job at Moody’s.’ ”63 Retaining talent was also difficult, 
and a revolving door saw rating analysts leaving to work for client-
issuers.64 “ ‘[Y]ou have the [credit rating agency] asset-backed people, 
who are basically like brain-dead.’ ”65
 The employees whom the credit rating agencies managed to hire 
and retain found themselves working longer hours66 without suffi-
cient resources to analyze the complex instruments which were being 
rated.67 Throughout the years leading up to the financial crisis, credit 
rating analysts repeatedly raised the issue that such underresourcing 
by the agencies was having a negative impact on rating quality.68
 Underresourcing by the credit rating agencies extended to their 
RMBS and CDO surveillance departments, whose job it was to moni-
tor the instruments after the initial ratings were assigned in order to 
affirm, upgrade, or downgrade the initial ratings.69 As noted in Part 
III, on July 10, 2007, the rating agencies shook the financial mar-
kets70 by abruptly downgrading large numbers of RMBSs and 
CDOs.71 This massive downgrade may have occurred earlier, and in a 
more wide-spread fashion, had the surveillance departments been 
adequately resourced.72
D.   Flawed Models and Information Asymmetry 
 According to Professor Partnoy’s 1999 criticism of the models em-
ployed by rating agencies to evaluate structured financial instruments:73
CBO structurers appear to be able to make money from these 
transactions because either (1) high-yield bonds are systematically 
underpriced . . . or (2) the methodology the credit rating agencies 
 63. MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 98 (2010) (quoting a Goldman Sachs hedge 
fund manager). 
 64.  See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 22, at 150. 
 65.  Id. at 98-99 (quoting a Morgan Stanley quantitative analyst). 
 66.  ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 7, at 304. 
 67.  See id. at 289-302, 304. 
 68.  See id. at 305-06. 
 69.  See id. at 307. 
 70.  See id. at 243. 
 71. See id. at 310. 
 72.  Cf. id. at 308-09 (“ ‘I talked to Tommy yesterday and he thinks that the [RMBS] 
ratings are not going to hold through 2007. He asked me to begin discussing taking rating 
actions earlier on the poor performing deals. I have been thinking about this for much of 
the night. We do not have the resources to support what we are doing now. A new process, 
without the right support, would be overwhelming. . . . My group is under serious pressure 
to respond to the burgeoning poor performance of sub-prime deals. . . . [W]e are really 
falling behind. . . . I am seeing evidence that I really need to add staff to keep up with what 
is going on with sub prime and mortgage performance in general, NOW.’ ” Email from 
Ernestine Warner, head of S&P’s RMBS Surveillance Group, to Peter D’Erchia, global head 
of S&P’s Global Structured Finance Ratings Group (Feb. 3, 2007) (first alteration in origi-
nal) (first emphasis added)). 
 73.  A collateralized bond obligation is structured similarly to a CDO. Cf. Partnoy, 
supra note 17, at 666. 
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use to rate bonds issued by the CBO vehicle is misguided and al-
lows the creation of a greater whole from the sum of its parts, de-
spite the absence of any conceivable synergy.74
 Indeed, the rating agencies’ models leading up to the crisis “as-
sumed that securitizers could create safer financial products by 
diversifying among many mortgage-backed securities.”75 During this 
time, the models employed by the agencies severely discounted the 
correlative risk76 of the assets which comprised RMBSs prior to the 
crisis.77 This flaw was then carried forward: when rating CDOs, the 
rating agencies plugged in the ratings previously assigned to the un-
derlying RMBSs rather than the further underlying characteristics of 
the loans comprising these RMBSs.78
 Moreover, even if the credit rating agencies had looked through to 
the underlying RMBS assets, their models for evaluating the indi-
vidual loans were flawed, because they only examined “the general 
characteristics of loan pools.”79 The rating agencies’ models factored 
in the average credit scores of borrowers in a given RMBS loan pool, 
which allowed issuers to exploit this information asymmetry and 
structure pools of loans filled with high-risk borrowers with low cred-
it scores, as long as loans to borrowers with high credit scores were 
included as offsets.80
 The models for evaluating RMBSs were furthered flawed leading 
up to the crisis because they relied too much on past mortgage indus-
try data, rather than taking into consideration the proliferation of 
loosening underwriting standards and nontraditional mortgages.81
Furthermore, the models assumed ever-rising home prices, rather 
than stagnant or falling prices.82
 When flaws in the RMBS and CDO models were remedied towards 
the end of the housing boom, they were only applied to new instru-
ments, rather than being used for the surveillance of existing in-
struments.83 The agencies instead waited until events on the ground 
 74.  Id.
 75.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 22, at 149. 
 76.  “Correlative risk measures the likelihood of multiple negative events happening 
simultaneously, such as the likelihood of RMBS assets defaulting together.” ANATOMY OF A 
FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 7, at 292. 
 77.  Id. at 292-93. S&P’s model assumed a 40% probability of correlated RMBS asset 
defaults, when in reality, the probability was a least 80%. See id. at 292. 
 78.  See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 22, at 146-47 (internal quotes omitted). 
 79.  LEWIS, supra note 63, at 99. 
 80.  Id. at 99-100. Issuers further exploited rating agency RMBS model flaws by 
selecting loans made to borrowers whose short credit histories gave them artificially high 
credit scores (“thin-file FICO score[s]”). See id. at 100. 
 81.  See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 7, at 288-89. 
 82.  See id. at 289. 
 83.  Id. at 303. 
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proved their methodologies critically unsound to issue the massive 
downgrades beginning in July of 2007.84
V. DODD-FRANK’S REFORMS OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
A.   Increased Private Liability 
 1.   Sections 932(a), 939(G), and 933(a) 
 Implicitly, Dodd-Frank’s credit rating agency reforms begin by 
discreetly subjecting the credit rating agencies to more potential private 
liability. Pursuant to the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006,85
which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)86
to regulate NRSROs,87 credit rating agencies were required to furnish
certain information, certifications, and financial statements to the 
SEC when initially registering as NRSROs88 and thereafter.89 Dodd-
Frank amended these90 and other related provisions to read file in-
stead of furnish.91 The import of this change becomes apparent when 
read in conjunction with section 18 of the Exchange Act, which 
makes any person who files materially false or misleading infor-
mation with the SEC potentially liable to damaged investors who 
bought or sold a security in reliance on such information.92
 Next, Dodd-Frank amended the Exchange Act by making clear 
that statements made by credit rating agencies “shall not be deemed 
forward-looking statements for the purposes of section 21E.”93 Section 
21E of the Exchange Act contains a safe harbor provision94 which ex-
empts issuers from liability, in private actions under the Exchange 
Act, for false or misleading forward-looking statements that are iden-
tified as such by the issuer making the statement and that are ac-
companied by meaningful cautionary statements regarding the pos-
 84.  Id. at 243, 303. 
 85.  Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 
 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006)). 
 86.  15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006). 
 87.  Id. § 78o-7(n)(2), 7(o)(1). 
 88.  Id. § 78o-7(a)(1)(A). 
 89.  Id. § 78o-7(b), (k). 
 90.  Due to possible drafting error, Dodd-Frank left in place the term furnish when it 
comes to initial NRSRO registration. See id. § 78o-7(a)(1). 
 91.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 932(a)(1), (3)(C), (3)(G)((i), (6), (7) (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
7(b), (d)(1)(D), (k), and (l)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2010), respectively). 
 92.  15 U.S.C. § 78r (2006); see SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP &
AFFILIATES, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: COMMENTARY AND INSIGHTS 75 (2010), available at
http://www.skadden.com/Cimages/siteFile/Skadden_Insights_Special_Edition_Dodd-
Frank_Act1.pdf. 
 93.  Dodd-Frank Act § 933(m) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m) (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 94.  Section 21E was written into law as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 753-55 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (2006)). 
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sibility of future results turning out differently than those in the 
statement forecast.95
 Skipping ahead, Title IX, Subtitle C of Dodd-Frank closes by ex-
plicitly stating that “Rule 436(g), promulgated by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission under the Securities Act of 1933, shall have 
no force or effect.”96 Rule 436(g) had exempted the credit rating 
agencies from the general portion of Rule 436.97 Rule 436 states that 
if an issuer’s filed registration statement or prospectus quotes or 
summarizes an expert or states that such an expert has reviewed or 
passed upon the information contained therein, then the issuer is re-
quired to obtain and file the written consent of the expert, which 
would then become part of the registration statement or prospectus.98
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)99 renders con-
senting experts strictly liable to damaged investors for materially 
false or misleading expert statements included in registration state-
ments or prospectuses.100
 2.   Section 933(b) 
 Dodd-Frank’s section 933(b), the focus of this Note, is the coup de 
grâce in terms of subjecting credit rating agencies to increased (and 
meaningful) private liability under the securities laws. A bit of back-
ground is required to adequately explain the function and import of 
section 933(b). As explained by the Supreme Court: 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 forbids the 
“use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity . . . , [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors.” SEC Rule 10b-5 implements § 10(b) by 
declaring it unlawful:  
 “(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,  
 “(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made . . . not misleading, or  
 “(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”101
 95.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (2006). 
 96.  Dodd-Frank Act § 939(G). 
 97.  17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g) (2006). 
 98.  Id. § 230.436(a), (b). 
 99.  Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)). 
 100.  15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (2006). 
 101.  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318 (2007) (alteration 
in original) (internal citations omitted). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 is located at the following: Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 891 
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 Although the Rule does not say so explicitly, the Supreme Court 
has held that Rule 10b-5 gives rise to an implied private right of ac-
tion102 and that to establish liability, the “plaintiff must prove that 
the defendant acted with . . . ‘a mental state embracing intent to de-
ceive, manipulate, or defraud.’ ”103 While negligence will not suffice, 
lower courts have ruled that the necessary scienter may be estab-
lished in certain circumstances by recklessness.104
 Section 21D(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, inserted by the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), requires private 
class action plaintiffs suing for money damages under the Exchange 
Act’s anti-fraud provisions to plead “with particularity facts giving 
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required 
state of mind”105 in order to survive a motion to dismiss.106 Most sig-
nificantly, PSLRA stays discovery during the pendency of any motion 
to dismiss.107
 Therefore, prior to Dodd-Frank, a class action plaintiff suing a 
credit rating agency for money damages under Rule 10b-5 would 
have had to plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong in-
ference that the rating agency knowingly or recklessly acted to de-
ceive, manipulate, or defraud, in order to survive a motion to dismiss 
and get to the crucial step of discovery. 
 Section 933(b) lowers the bar by creating a specific exception for 
suits against credit rating agencies. It is now sufficient to plead:  
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
credit rating agency knowingly or recklessly failed— 
“(i) to conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated security with 
respect to the factual elements relied upon by its own methodology 
for evaluating credit risk; or  
“(ii) to obtain reasonable verification of such factual elements 
(which verification may be based on a sampling technique that 
does not amount to an audit) from other sources that the credit 
                                                                                                                  
(1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006)). SEC Rule 10b-5 is located at 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5 (1949). 
 102.  See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 318.
 103.  Id. at 319 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94, 194 n.12 (1976)). 
 104.  See Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 343-44 (4th Cir. 
2003) (surveying the law from other circuits and defining recklessness as “ ‘an act so highly 
unreasonable and such an extreme departure from the standard of ordinary care as to 
present a danger of misleading the plaintiff to the extent that the danger was either known 
to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.’ ” (quoting 
Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 621 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
 105.  See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
§21D(b)(2), 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2006)). 
 106.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A). 
 107.  Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
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rating agency considered to be competent and that were independ-
ent of the issuer and underwriter.”108
 Besides creating a novel carve-out in PSLRA for suits against 
credit rating agencies, this congressionally-imposed lowered pleading 
standard is significant in and of itself, as it bucks the recent trend of 
court-imposed heightened pleading standards in federal lawsuits.109
B.   Increased Public Regulation and Oversight 
 While not the focus of this Note, Dodd-Frank’s new regulation and 
oversight regime for credit rating agencies is briefly (and broadly)
addressed below because, in it, Congress has made an earnest at-
tempt to remedy many of the root causes of rating inaccuracy dis-
cussed above. 
 Early in the text of Title IX, Subtitle C, Dodd-Frank reiterates the 
fact that neither the SEC nor the states may regulate the sub-
stance, procedures, or methodologies of credit ratings.110 NRSROs 
are required by Dodd-Frank to establish and enforce internal control 
structures, which the SEC is given authority to monitor.111 In addi-
tion to the NRSROs themselves, individuals associated with NRSROs 
now face the possibility of being suspended or barred from associat-
ing with NRSROs for a litany of reasons necessary for investor 
protection.112 Subtitle C goes on to give the SEC a scalpel with the 
new authority to suspend or revoke NRSRO status partially for 
particular instrument classes/subclasses, if the SEC finds that an 
NRSRO lacks adequate resources to produce accurate ratings for 
these instruments.113
 Dodd-Frank mandates that the SEC promulgate rules to prevent 
sales and marketing considerations from influencing NRSRO rat-
ings114 and attempts to shrink the revolving door by mandating that 
NRSROs: (1) establish reviewable internal controls to address this; 
and (2) report to the SEC when a former senior officer or employee 
becomes employed by a client-issuer.115
 As to compliance officers employed by NRSROs, Dodd-Frank pro-
hibits them from being involved in the ratings process, sales, marketing, 
 108.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1884, § 933(b)(2)(B) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 109.  E.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (extending Twombly beyond 
antitrust suits); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding that 
antitrust plaintiffs were required to plead enough facts to state a plausible claim, rather 
than a short and plain statement entitling relief).  
 110.  See Dodd-Frank Act § 932(a)(2)(A) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2)). 
 111.  See id. § 932(a)(2)(B) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(3)). 
 112.  See id. § 932(a)(3) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(d)). 
 113.  See id. § 932(a)(3)(F) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(d)(2)). 
 114.  See id. § 932(a)(4) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(3)(A)). 
 115.  See id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(4)-(h)(5)). 
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or in setting compensation.116 Compliance officers, whose compensa-
tion may not be linked to company financial performance,117 are in-
stead required to establish procedures regarding handling internal 
and external complaints involving rating methodologies118 and to file 
annual reports to the SEC.119
 Significantly, Dodd-Frank directs the SEC to establish an expert-
staffed Office of Credit Ratings (OCR) to administer SEC rules 
regarding NRSRO: (1) rating practices; (2) ratings accuracy; and 
(3) conflicts of interest.120 The OCR is also tasked with NRSRO 
examination and oversight,121 and the SEC is required to publicize 
annual reports which accessibly summarize: (1) the OCR examina-
tions; (2) NRSRO responses to certain identified deficiencies; and 
(3) the adequacy of NRSRO remediation in response to previous 
SEC recommendations.122
 The SEC is directed to establish rules, fines, and penalties appli-
cable to NRSROs for violations of the new provisions relating to credit 
ratings and is given discretionary authority to promulgate other 
necessary rules.123 Dodd-Frank directs the SEC to promulgate 
rules regarding NRSRO performance transparency, methodologies,124
and disclosure.125
 Section 932 addresses NRSRO board independence, mandating 
“[a]t least [half] of the board of directors, but not fewer than [two] of 
the members thereof, shall be independent” and that some portion of 
the independent directors include end-users of the NRSRO’s rat-
ings.126 Additionally, NRSRO boards are given duties to oversee rat-
ing methodologies and internal credit rating controls.127
 Next, section 934 of Dodd-Frank obligates NRSROs to report, to 
law enforcement or regulators, credible third-party information re-
garding material violations of the law by client-issuers.128 Section 935 
mandates that NRSROs consider credible and significant third-
party information about issuers when producing ratings.129 Section 
936 directs the SEC to promulgate rules to ensure NRSRO employees 
 116.  See id. § 932(a)(5) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(j)(2)(A)). 
 117.  See id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(j)(4)). 
 118.  See id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(j)(3)). 
 119.  See id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(j)(5)). 
 120.  See id. § 932(a)(8) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(p)(1)(A), (2)). 
 121.  See id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(p)(3)). 
 122.  See id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(p)(3)(C)). 
 123.  See id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(p)(4)). 
 124.  Regarding internal controls, consistency, public disclosure of the reasoning for 
changes, and transparency see generally id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(r)). 
 125.  See generally id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(q)-(s)). 
 126.  Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(t)(1)-(2)). 
 127.  Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(t)(3)). 
 128.  Id. § 934 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(u)). 
 129.  Id. § 935 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(v)). 
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engaging in the ratings process are adequately trained, experienced, 
and competent and that they are “tested for knowledge of the cred-
it rating process.”130 Section 938 directs the SEC to promulgate 
rules regarding the clear definition and consistent application of 
ratings symbols.131
 Effective in 2012,132 section 939 of Dodd-Frank begins the process 
of removing references to NRSROs and credit ratings from myriad 
federal laws.133 In a similar vein, Dodd-Frank also directs federal 
agencies to review their regulations referencing credit ratings and 
remove such references, substituting appropriate standards of 
“credit-worthiness.”134
 Lastly, fitting with the pattern of large pieces of legislation, Dodd-
Frank directs a number of studies to be carried out regarding standard-
ized credit ratings,135 the restriction of NRSRO ancillary services,136
alternatives to the issuer-pays model,137 and the creation of an independ-
ent self-regulatory body for credit rating analyst professionalism.138
VI.   SECTION 933(b) IS INDISPENSIBLE TO THE CAUSE OF                  
CREDIT RATING AGENCY REFORM
A.   Countercyclical Implementation 
 1.   Background 
 Financial market discipline is impaired in boom times, as institu-
tions and investors expand their own leverage, lending, and invest-
ments.139 The reverse occurs when booms turn to busts.140 As the 
boom-bust cycle is inevitable, policies and regulation should work to 
“calm the booms and soften the busts.”141 Countercyclical economic 
policies are those which “lean against the wind,” tightening regula-
tion, oversight, and fiscal policies during good times, while reverse 
course during downturns.142
 130.  Id. § 936. 
 131.  Id. § 938. 
 132.  Id. § 939(g). 
 133.  See id. § 939(a)-(f) (codified respectively at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(E)(i) (Supp. IV 
2010); 12 U.S.C. § 1831e(d)-(e) (Supp. IV 2010); 12 U.S.C. § 4519 (Supp. IV 2010); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-6a(5)(A)(iv)(I) (Supp. IV 2010); 12 U.S.C. § 24(a)(2)(E), (3), (f), (f)(1) (Supp. IV 2010); 
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(41)) (Supp. IV 2010), (53)(A); and 22 U.S.C. § 286hh(a)(6) (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 134.  Id. § 939A. 
 135.  See id. § 939(h). 
 136.  See id. § 939C. 
 137.  See id. § 939D, F. 
 138.  See id. § 939E. 
 139.  See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 60, at xviii. 
 140.  See id.
 141.  See id.
 142.  Id. at 32. 
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 The problem with pursuing such an economic policy is that it is 
extremely difficult to implement. After a crisis which results in a 
bust, people and policymakers demand more regulation and over-
sight.143 This tightening is not needed, because institutions and 
investors are risk-adverse.144 And during boom economic times, when 
optimism and asset prices are rising and tightening is needed, no one 
wants to be the one to spoil the party.145
 2.   Illustrations 
 Examples can be seen in the passage of Dodd-Frank itself, as well 
as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). GLBA deregulated the fi-
nancial industry by repealing the decades-long separation of com-
mercial and investment banking mandated by the Glass-Steagall 
Act.146 The GLBA was enacted on November 12, 1999,147 near the 
height of the Dot-Com technology-asset boom.148 As for Dodd-Frank, 
its final passage occurred on July 21, 2010,149 when the nationwide 
unemployment rate was 9.5%, a twenty-seven-year high.150
 The fate and effect of section 939(G), discussed in Part IV(A)(I) of 
this Note, illustrate the danger of cyclical regulation in the midst of a 
bust.151 Parts of SEC Regulation AB require that issuers of asset-
backed securities disclose whether the issuance of these securities is 
conditioned on the assignment of a credit rating and, if so, identify 
the credit rating agency and the minimum rating required for the 
issuance to proceed.152 Regulation AB requires issuers to disclose in 
the prospectus “any arrangements to have such rating monitored 
while the asset-backed securities are outstanding.”153
 Therefore, after the repeal of Rule 436(g), asset-backed security 
issuers would be: (1) required by Regulation AB to include infor-
 143.  See id. at 37. 
 144.  Id.
 145.  Id.
 146.  See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1341, § 101(a) (1999) 
(repealing 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994)). 
 147.  Id. § 101(a). 
 148.  Cf. Brent Goldfarb et al., Was There Too Little Entry During the Dot Com Era? 1 
(Univ. of Md. Robert H. Smith Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. RHS 06-029, 2006), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=899100. 
 149.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 150.  See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (A table demonstrating this un-
employment static can be generated at this website by changing the “From” date located to 
the right of “Change Output Options” title to 1983.). 
 151.  The economic situation was still one of malaise in November of 2010. See Paul 
Krugman, Op-Ed, Doing It Again, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2010, at A25, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/08/opinion/08krugman.html. 
 152.  17 C.F.R. § 229.1103(a)(9) (2011); Id. § 229.1120. 
 153.  Id. § 229.1120. 
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mation on credit ratings and credit rating agencies in instrument 
prospectuses; and (2) required by Rule 436 to gain the consent of 
credit rating agencies to be included as experts. The credit rating 
agencies involved in rating these asset-backed securities would then 
be subject to Section 11 liability.154 Once the repeal of Rule 436(g) 
went into effect, the credit rating agencies refused to provide this 
needed consent, which in turn threatened to grind the asset-backed 
securities issuance market to a halt.155 To avoid this result, the SEC 
issued no-action letters to asset-backed securities issuers,156 which 
exempted them from the problematic Regulation AB requirements.157
 3.   Section 933(b)’s Conduciveness to Countercyclical Implementation 
 Dodd-Frank took more than a year to come into law—from Presi-
dent Obama’s initial proposal for an overhaul of the financial industry 
in June of 2009,158 to the act’s passage in July of 2010. Moreover, 
the centerpiece SEC Office of Credit Ratings created by Dodd-
Frank has yet to come into existence, due to budgetary issues.159
Should economic conditions necessitate countercyclical changes to 
the regulation of credit rating agencies, a lengthy overhaul of the 
myriad U.S. Code provisions, regulations, and bureaucracies put in 
place by Title IX, Subtitle C would be necessary. Dodd-Frank’s 
credit rating agency regulatory and oversight regime is ill-suited for 
countercyclical implementation. 
 Section 933(b), which minimally amended the U.S. Code to lower 
the pleading standard in a discreet area of securities law, is condu-
cive to countercyclical implementation and can be further amended 
to appropriately respond to changing economic circumstances. While 
Congress and the President would still need to act to alter section 
933(b), there are no bureaucracies or regulations which flow from it, 
and changes made would be self-executing, as the provision is merely 
a door into the federal courtroom. Simply put, section 933(b) is a liti-
gation valve which can be tightened or loosened, relatively quickly, 
with a few strokes of the Article I and II pens. 
 154.  15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (2006). 
 155.  Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Remarks at The SEC Speaks in 2011 (Feb. 4, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch020411tap.htm). 
 156.  See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co., S.E.C. No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 2882538, at *1 
(Nov. 23, 2010). 
 157.  See Paredes, supra note 155. 
 158.  See Dealbook, Obama Proposes New Financial Regulations, June 17, 2009, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/obama-proposes-new-financial-regulations/. 
 159.  See Morrissey, supra note 5. 
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B.   Private Enforcement 
 “[P]rivate securities fraud actions provide ‘a most effective weapon 
[for] the enforcement’ of securities laws and are ‘a necessary supple-
ment to [SEC] action.’ ”160 The latter part of that statement is proba-
bly truer today than ever, as the United States faces mounting budg-
et deficits,161 which threaten to divert funding away from the SEC.162
In that regard section 933(b)’s regulation-through-private-litigation 
approach is generally well-suited to this specific moment in history. 
Moreover, section 933(b)’s virtues lie beyond the context of recent 
budgetary constraints, due to the general merits of private enforce-
ment of the securities laws. In this regard, Professor Burch’s work is 
particularly illustrative.163
 1.   SEC Capture and Politicized Prioritization  
 Regulatory capture in this context means a regulatory body sur-
renders to the wishes of the industry it is supposed to be regulating, 
rather than serving the needs of the public.164 When a company has 
shifted from relying on reputational capital to selling regulatory li-
censes, regulatory capture is essential to ensuring that public outcry 
over the company’s deteriorating product quality does not lead to the 
company’s loss of profits and power; indeed, regulatory capture can 
sustain a license-seller’s “profit and power indefinitely.”165
 Even if one views claims of regulatory capture of the SEC as exag-
gerated, the SEC is, at the end of the day, subject to political pres-
sures due to the congressional oversight and appropriations process, 
as well as the fact that the chairman is appointed by the President,166
and its enforcement priorities are shaped by these pressures.167
This is where private enforcement of the securities laws becomes 
important. Lawsuits, brought by plaintiffs and attorneys not subject 
to capture or pressure, act as a “safety valve” to continue to bring 
important enforcement actions, despite industry predations or po-
 160.  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318-19 (2007) (quoting 
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)). 
 161.  See Vincent Del Giudice, U.S. Budget Deficit Expanded to Monthly Record $222.5 
Billion in February, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 10, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-
10/u-s-had-record-222-5-billion-monthly-budget-gap-in-february.html. 
 162.  See Jesse Hamilton, House’s Frank Says Republican Budget Would Undermine 
Regulators, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 7, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-07/house-
s-frank-says-republican-budget-would-undermine-regulators.html. 
 163.  Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions As Pragmatic Ex Post
Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63 (2008). 
 164.  See id. at 102 n.192. 
 165.  Partnoy, supra note 17, at 684. 
 166.  Burch, supra note 163, at 103. 
 167.  Id.
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litical priorities.168 Given this, section 933(b) would continue to ensure 
regulation of the credit rating agencies, even if the SEC’s priorities 
moved elsewhere. 
 2.   Deterrence 
 It is almost axiomatic that the increased threat of large federal 
lawsuits surviving motions to dismiss to reach the discovery stage 
and beyond would serve to deter wrongful behavior of profit-
maximizing credit rating agencies. But aside from the threat of 
reduced defendant company profitability, securities class action suits 
also serve to directly deter CEO misbehavior through the threat of 
negative personal consequences.169 Studies show that defendant com-
panies sued in securities class action lawsuits experience higher CEO 
turnover rates than companies that merely suffer large decreases in 
stock prices.170 Thus, section 933(b)’s increased class action liability 
threat acts as a deterrent to the misbehavior of credit rating agencies 
and, in particular, their CEOs. 
 3.   Innovation 
 If the SEC ever became ossified and wed to the status quo, at the 
moment change is needed, section 933(b) would enhance the flow of 
needed fresh air. “Private rights of action conjoined with claim pool-
ing create self-funded supplemental regulators who can afford to pio-
neer legal theories, hire cutting-edge experts, design sophisticated 
damage models, conduct electronic discovery, monitor the market, 
and engineer fraud detection techniques.”171
VII. THE ELIMINATION OF NRSRO REFERENCES IS A                          
NECESSARY SUPPLEMENT
 Legislative reforms of the credit rating agencies should not stop at 
section 933(b) of Dodd-Frank. While section 933(b) will go a long way 
towards curbing the misbehavior of the credit rating agencies, it does 
not solve the problem of credit rating agencies’ loosened concern for 
maintaining reputational capital, which has at its root cause the web 
of state and federal statutory and regulatory references to NRSROs, 
as discussed in Part IV(A). And while Dodd-Frank begins a move in the 
right direction via sections 939 and 939A, discussed in Part V(B), these 
provisions have no effect on nonfederal NRSRO regulatory reliance. 
 168.  Stephen Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection on Legal Front, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29/business/ 
29corporate.html?pagewanted=1. 
 169.  See Burch, supra note 163, at 94-95. 
 170.  Greg Niehaus & Greg Roth, Insider Trading, Equity Issues, and CEO Turnover in 
Firms Subject to Securities Class Action, 28 FIN. MGMT. 52, 53 (1999). 
 171.  See Burch, supra note 163, at 91. 
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 Therefore, to supplement the strides made by Dodd-Frank, the 
recommendation advanced by Professor Partnoy before172 and after173
the financial crisis should be implemented. Partnoy recommends that 
references to credit ratings in regulations should be universally excised 
and substituted with references to credit spreads,174 as appropriate.175
“[B]ecause credit spreads are determined by the market as a whole, 
not by any individual entity or entities, a credit spread-based system 
would not create regulatory licenses for any approved agency.”176
 With credit rating agencies subject to increased ex post regulation 
in the form of easier private securities class action lawsuits, and with 
their ability to sell regulatory licenses eviscerated, credit rating 
agencies will be incentivized to jealously guard their reputational 
capital, resulting in the issuance of more accurate ratings. 
VIII. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH SECTION 933(b)’S APPROACH
A.   The First Amendment 
 The most serious problem with the section 933(b) approach to reg-
ulating credit rating agencies through private securities class action 
lawsuits is the potential First Amendment freedom of speech liability 
shield for the rating agencies. Several relatively recent lower court 
rulings have held that agencies’ credit ratings are protected by the 
First Amendment under the “actual malice standard,”177 which pro-
tects speakers from liability for false statements unless the state-
ment was made “ ‘with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.’ ”178 Under “actual malice,” 
communications which cannot be proven false (that is, opinions) are 
protected by the First Amendment,179 and lower courts have held that 
credit ratings fall into this protected category.180
 However, the Supreme Court has not ruled one way or the other 
on whether credit ratings are entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion, and plausible arguments have been advanced that credit ratings 
 172.  Partnoy, supra note 17, at 704. 
 173.  Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings was a Primary Cause of the 
Crisis 14-15 (Univ. Of San Diego Sch. Of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. 09-015, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1430653. 
 174.  A “credit spread is the difference between the yield on the bond and the yield on a 
risk-free bond [i.e., U.S. Treasury] of comparable structure and maturity.” Partnoy, supra 
note 17, at 705 n.388. 
 175.  Id. at 704; Partnoy, supra note 173. 
 176.  Partnoy, supra note 17, at 705. 
 177.  Deats, supra note 11, at 1831-32 (discussing Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s 
Investors Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2007); Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. 
Moody’s Investor’s Servs., 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999); and Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 
v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). 
 178.  Id. at 1832 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)). 
 179.  Id. at 1833. 
 180.  Id. at 1833-34. 
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fall under the category of commercial speech, which does not receive 
First Amendment protection if it is misleading.181 Indeed, Congress 
seemed to signal this view when it found that “the activities of credit 
rating agencies are fundamentally commercial in character.”182
B.   Political Branch Imperviousness to                                          
Countercyclical Implementation 
 Section 933(b)’s approach is virtuous because of its conduciveness 
to countercyclical implementation. However, to alter section 933(b), 
the political branches of the U.S. government must act. Professor 
Brunnermeier and others argue that those implementing effective 
countercyclical measures must “enjoy a degree of [political] inde-
pendence that allows them to impose potentially unpopular steps.”183
 Yet, as argued in Part V(A)(3), section 933(b) is conducive to coun-
tercyclical implementation due to the ease and speed to which the 
political branches (with the will to stand against the wind) can tweak 
the provision in the face of changing economic facts on the ground. 
And the question remains: What better alternative to the political 
branches exists to implement countercyclical changes in the pleading 
requirements? Courts are certainly politically independent, but they 
can be slower to make needed changes in the law to conform to new 
factual situations. 
IX. CONCLUSION
Section 933(b), a brief provision in the midst of the massive and 
complex Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, opens the door to more meaningful private regulation of credit 
rating agencies—whose inaccuracy in assessing the risk of mortgage-
backed securities and other instruments was a primary cause of the 
financial crisis of 2007-08. By no means the whole answer to the 
problem of rating agency inaccuracy, section 933(b) is a dramatic step 
in the right direction, and if supplemented by regulatory changes 
away from a reliance on NRSROs, it will incentivize the rating agen-
cies to seek to preserve their reputational capital and strive for rat-
ing accuracy above all else. 
 181.  Id. at 1836-37. 
 182.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 931(3), 124 Stat. 1872 (2010). 
 183.  See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 60, at 37. 
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